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Abstract

Marriage and gender inequality represent two nearly amaranthine worldwide conventions. This
research looks to compare the relative local political economics of marriage with worldwide
gender inequality. A comparison of United Nations gender inequality index ratings with this
works duly established relative local marriage market gender equity values systems ratings
indicate the presence of potentially significant correlation within these two data sets. This study
concludes that these findings merit a more comprehensive look at prevailing global/ local
cultural marriage traditions and their potential relationship with the prevalence of worldwide
gender inequality.
Keywords: marriage market, gender equity, bride price, dowry, groom price, partner price,
marriage market gender equity value systems ratings (MMGEVS) United Nations Gender
Inequality Index (UNGII)
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Gender equity power flow dynamics, relative local marriage market values systems
and worldwide gender inequality. The United Nations (2000, 2005 & 2010) affirms that
gender inequality continues to be a significant issue throughout the world (UNWW). “Despite
calls for gender equality, women are significantly under-represented in Governments, political
parties and at the United Nations” as reported by the UNWW (2000, pg. 151). For example, “7
of 150 elected Heads of State in the world were women, and only 11 of 192 Heads of
Government” (UNWW, 2010 pg. X).
In an effort to quantify worldwide gender inequality the United Nations have developed
the Gender Inequality Index (2012). This rating, and ranking establishes a gender inequality
score based on metrics from several other international studies. The UNGII-FAQ (2014) noted
“The Gender Inequality Index is similar in method to the Inequality-adjusted Human
Development Index (IHDI). It can be interpreted as a percentage loss to potential human
development due to shortfalls in the dimensions included” such as, gender specific levels of
access to society, health, economy, government (pg. 1).
Not one of the more than 200 participant countries attained a perfect gender equity score
of zero. Furthermore, not one country was found to have a matriarchal society, all were found to
be patriarchal, to varying degrees. Gender equity did not exist anywhere on the planet as rated by
the United Nations (UNGII, 2012).
This work will investigate marriage and worldwide gender inequality; the gender power
flow dynamics of culturally relevant local coupling observances, of bride price, dowry, courting,
dating or the like, of marriage market values systems worldwide. What if any potential
relationship(s) might these various coupling observances have with respects to predominant
worldwide gender inequality? Whereas the various marriage associated observances differed
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considerably throughout the world, marriage has remained a worldwide phenomenon, as does
gender inequality.
The glass slipper and the glass ceiling, are they one and the same? Socially manufactured
derivations of predominating gender constructs, which have emerged from the many various
cultural coupling observances’ deeply embedded traditions? Are these various cultural coupling
observances, or, relative local marriage market values systems, serving to perpetuate gender
inequality worldwide?
Three fundamental principles represent the theoretical grounding for this research. First,
that women are, or that the female gender construct is, subordinate to that of the male gender
construct. Second, that both men and women are, for all intents and purposes, a commodity.
Finally, that the commodification of men and women through the marriage market, represents a
significant social force capable of influencing and perpetuating worldwide systemic gender
inequality.
John Locke (circa 1690) exampled man and woman, husband and wife as the first civil
society: he expressed the idea that “Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between
man and woman” (as cited in MacPherson 1980, pg. 43). A western centric view point is one of
democratic ideals, that of a voluntary or equitably agreed upon conjugal society. None the less,
within these earliest of societies Locke did in fact cast the male as the leader over the female,
voluntary, patriarchal (MacPherson, 1980).
Whether or not the many various conjugal societies were or were not voluntary in nature,
and to what extent is not at issue for this specific research. At issue is the significance of the
observance itself, of relative local marriage market gender equity values systems worldwide,
pursuant to systemic global gender inequality. This research will not attempt to define voluntary
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conjugal societies excepting as follows. The persistence of said observance(s) in any given
collective, whether official or unofficial, would for the sake of this research render these various
coupling observances more or less voluntary in nature.
Within the UN Gender Inequality Index (UNGII) there are some potential issues owing to
possible western biases. The majority of the countries which scored lower, i.e. better; those
collectives which afforded greater levels of female access or equality within their societies,
according to the UNGII, were predominantly westernized; capitalist, democratic, developed.
Furthermore, the countries or regions which ranked at the lower end of the UNGII scale tended
towards developing, underdeveloped or undeveloped countries primarily. In addition, different
cultures can have and do have different values, different priorities. Human rights, women’s
rights, gender equity and or women’s access to society can and do have many different meanings
within the many different social collectives around the globe.
The UN report continued with a mention of some of the limitations of the data as well; the
UNGII was far from perfect, far from exacting and was limited in scope by numerous factors.
Factors such as, using national governance participation rates rather than local governance
participation rates in the index, and lacking a broader internationally agreed upon set of
standards with which to work on many issues. These and many other difficulties limited the type,
the quality and the amount of data collectable, and or useable. None the less the UNGII
represents best available data pursuant to a practical measurement of worldwide gender
inequality, using metrics which had been agreed to by a large number of countries throughout the
world.
I will establish specific relative local coupling observance prevalence within each
preliminary sample country selected for this work. Using these data I will then establish a
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marriage market gender equity value system rating (MMGEVS): How much for the woman, or
how much for the man, a partner price? This will be based on socio-expectational economic
transfers measured as a percentage of individual annual earnings per capita within each sample
country. Finally this data will be compared with data from the UNGII 2012 data. Can gender
inequality data, as measured by the UNGII, be shown to potentially relate to resultant marriage
market gender equity value systems ratings data?
What are the relative marriage market gender equity value scale ratings within each
sample country? What is the UNGII rating of each sample country? And what if any potential
corroboration can be found within these two data sets?
Participant countries were selected based on where they were rated on the UNGII 2012
scale; a broad spectrum of ratings was desired, as well as the availability of sufficient data, the
specific type of relative local cultural coupling observances practiced; whether bride price,
dowry, westernized dating or the like. Population size was important in that this research was
attempting to look at larger worldwide trends. Further, a broad cross section of governance
models, social and economic developmental levels, religious practices, and belief systems was
desired. I will use India, China and the United States as my preliminary sample countries for this
study.
Can relative cultural variance within these coupling observances; whether our own
familiar westernized traditional dating and marriage observances, eastern bride price observances
or dowry observances or the like; relative cultural marriage equity market value systems, be
shown to correlate with relative global gender inequality worldwide? In any given society in
which gender equity (women’s rights) is rated, whether lower or higher, can relative local
culturally specific marriage market gender equity value scales ratings be shown to potentially
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correspond with the various levels of gender equity as tracked and rated by the United Nations
2012 Gender Inequality Index (UNGII)?
India will be presented first, China second and the United States third; with respects to
culturally specific coupling observances and gender specific economic socio-expectational
flows; presented as a percentage of annual income within each sample country. These data sets
will be used to establish MMGEVS ratings for each sample country. A gross value set will be
determined, based on local relative normative expectations. In addition, an adjusted value set will
be determined, based on approximated real world social practices. This value set will represent
net MMGEVS ratings. The forth section will be a comparison of the two data sets: The UNGII
rating for each of the three sample countries, and the resultant MMGEVS ratings for each sample
country. In the final section I will present discussion and conclusion(s).
India, dowry payment and marriage market values systems
India is reported as being a patriarchal society in which “…the secondary or powerless
position of the Indian woman appears to be at the core of the problem” noted Banerjee (2013, pg.
38). The Indian marriage market is dominated by dowry payment (Sautmann, 2011; Bhat &
Halli, 1999; Anderson, 2007). This is a reverse form of bride price (groom price) whereby the
bride, and or the bride’s family, pay the groom and or the groom’s family. The marriage itself
will not take place until or unless the dowry has been paid and even then if the dowry was not
deemed sufficient, following the marriage, more would be demanded and or expected.
Furthermore, dowry custom has maintained strong cultural support within India. Dowry
has in fact become a commonly observed marriage custom in India affecting some “…93-94% of
marriages, Anderson (2007a)” reported Sautmann (2011 pg. 6). This despite efforts from
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government; which has officially prohibited Dowry in 1961, local social activists, feminist
organizations and the like (Sautmann 2011, Banerjee, 2013).
The relative marriage market gender equity value system data for India was significantly
influenced by an overabundance of women. Which had resulted in bride price deflation, or
groom price hyperinflation; as opposed to a shortage of women, and an associated bride price
hyper-inflation within China’s marriage market (Jiang & Sanchez-Barricarte, 2012; Bhat &
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Halli, 1999). This was the result of a marriage squeeze in India (Rao, 1993; Sautmann, 2011;
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Bhat & Halli, 1999).
While demographically males do outnumber females, this is not true of marriage age
appropriate females, who actually outnumber marriage age appropriate males. A growing
population and shifting economic demographics are among the causes of the rise in practice and
price of Dowry in India (Bhat & Halli, 1999; Anderson, 2007). Reporting on several regions
throughout India, Anderson (2007) declared that while exacting figures were not available dowry
payments would commonly equate to “several times more than total annual household
income…” (pg. 155).
Income within various regions of India differs considerably, just as within China and the
United States of America. This study works to mitigate these incongruences by applying partner
price as a percentage of annual per capita income for all sample countries, in order to establish
local relative local (MMGEVS) ratings.
Anderson (2007) reported the rural region of Uttar Pradesh’ average dowry payments at 3
and 7 times the average annual male income, while in rural Karnataka dowry price averaged 6
times earnings. Further, dowry price for rural Tamil Nadu was reported at 8 time’s annual per
capita income (Anderson, 2007). These were rural regions notably regarded as regions with
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lower incomes than comparable urban regions within India. Delhi was the only major urban area
specifically reported on, with a dowry price approximating 4 time’s annual per capita income
(Anderson 2007). (See appendix A, chart 1.1)
In addition, MMGEVS ratings will be determined for three income levels. A lower level or
rural average income level (L1), an upper or urban average income level (L3) and a mid-level
income range (L2), an average of (L1) and (L3) values. Furthermore, a gross set of values and a
net set of values will be determined. Whereas a gross value data set will represent general
marriage market values systems local social expectations, a net value data set will represent an
adjusted value based on real world practice.
Data pursuant to general marriage market social values systems normative gross social
expectational results for India follow. Gross average dowry, groom price, or male partner price
rating for the middle 1/3 income range (L2) was a resultant 5.0. Again this represents a female to
male socio-expectational flow value or a groom price. Gross, unadjusted MMGEVS ratings for
(L1) were a resultant 6.0, while (L3) the average urban or upper income level rating was 4.0.
Cost expectancy ratios varied according to regional income levels. These values represent a
percentage of annual income per capita. (L3) at 4.0 represents 400% of income, or four years’
worth of individual per capita earnings approximately, (L2) at 5.0 represents five times annual
earnings and (L1) 6.0 represents a dowry price of 6 times average annual individual earnings
within India. (See appendix A, chart 1.2)
Dowry practice prevalence in India has been reported at ± 93.5%. India’s net MMGEVS
ratings will be adjusted to account for this difference in real world practice versus base social
expectations. The resultant approximated net value represents a net gender specific female to
male flow, a dowry payment, or groom price payment of 4.675 times approximate average
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annual per capita earnings (L2). With a lower income level value rating (L1) of 5.61 and an
upper level, or average urban income level value rating (L3) of 3.74. These values represent 5.6
and 3.74 times approximate annual earnings per capita. (See appendix A, chart 1.3, and
Appendix G, graph 1.4).
China, bride price and marriage market values systems
China has been described as a patrilineal society having a patrilocal marriage system- a
bride price system (Jiang & Sanchez-Barricarte, 2012; Zhang, 2000). Bride price is a wellaccepted and commonly observed practice within Chinese society. This owing as far back as the
Zhou dynasty; circa 1046 BCE to 246 BCE (Britannica, 2013). Jiang and Sanchez-Barricarte
(2012) reported “From that period on, the role and function of the bride price has never
weakened” (pg. 2). It has in fact not only remained a central core of marriage culture in China
but has increased in prevalence as market reforms have been instituted (Zhang, 2000). In
addition, there would be no marriage, no official engagement or the like, unless or until the bride
price was paid in full and in advance (Jiang & Sanchez, 2012).
‘“The prevalence of bride price in China is closely related to the surplus of males and the
lack of females’ (Caldwell, Reddy, & Caldwell, 1983; Chen, 2004)... in the marriage market, the
side of oversupply will compete for marriage at a cost” as Jiang & Sanchez-Barricarte (2012)
noted (pg. 3). Basic supply and demand; females were in short supply and demand was
exceedingly high.
Jiang and Sanchez- Barricarte (2012) added “A preference for sons and discrimination
against daughters has long existed in China” (pg. 3). Efforts have been made by some Chinese to
move beyond bride price observances, affording a more equitable role for the female. None the

MARRIAGE & GENDER INEQUALITY

11

less, bride price has been increasing steadily in China (Zhang, 2000; Jiang & Sanchez-Barricarte,
2012).
Relative bride price in Zhaocun village of Gansu Province was reported at approximately
15720y (Yuan) by the end of the 1990s, up from 2069y in the 1980s. Xiajia village of
Heilongjiang Province, China was reported at 28,500y. In addition, Zhang (2000) writing on
northern Chinese villages provided “In the early 1980s villagers spent 3000-4000 Yuan to
arrange a son's marriage, ten years later, they needed to spend 15,000-26,000 Yuan” (pg. 62).
Consequently, given corroborating data sets ranging from approximately 15,000y to 28,500y,
these will be the gross figures used. (See appendix B, chart 2.1)
In addition, Zhang (2000) reported that around 25% of dowries brought into the marriage
were at least equal to the average bride price payment during the 1980s, the earlier years of
reform efforts in China. This number had reportedly grown to approximately 50% by the end of
the 1990s (Zhang, 2000). These figures will be used for determining net MMGEVS ratings. (See
appendix B, chart 2.1)
Resultant data represents relative local normative gross expectational and net real world
approximated values. Gross bride price for (L1) was a resulting 15,000y and net (L1) was
11,250y; gross (L2) 21,750y, net (L2) 16,312y; gross (L3) 28,500y and net (L3) 21,375y. These
value range data will then be adjusted as a percentage of annual income per capita, as reported by
the Chinese Family Panel Studies at Peking University (Wong, 2013). (See appendix B, chart
2.1)
Annual per capita income for China was reported as 2100 US dollars, or about 13,122
Yuan (Wong, 2013). The average annual income in Shanghai, a large industrial coastal province,
was reported at 29,000. Gansu, a northern inland province had a figure of 11,400y; with 16,247y
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for an urban family and 9998y for a rural family being reported (Wong, 2013). Therefor these
resulting values, lower and upper annual income range values (L1) 9,998y, and (L3) 29,000y will
be used. In addition these two values will be averaged to produce (L2) 19,499y, an approximated
mid-level income level value. These data will be used in order to establish MMGEVS ratings
across various income levels, just as with all sample countries. (See appendix B, chart 2.2)
Resultant gross MMGEVS ratings for China were 1.5 (L1), 1.12 (L2) and 0.98 (L3)
respectively. Again, these values represent percentage multiples of annual income per capita (1x
= 100% of APCI); (L1) 1.5 represents 1.5 times annual per capita income, (L2) 1.12 represents
1.12 times annual per capita income, and 0.98 represents 98% of annual individual earnings.
(See appendix B, chart 2.3).
Finally, ± 90% bride price participation rates were reported, and approximately 1/2 of all
bride price payments were made in full. An adjusted net average bride price or partner price will
reflect these values as an approximated real world adjusted net value. Net (L2) or the middle
income level 1/3 MMGEVS rating was a resultant 0.75, or 75% of annual per capita earnings,
net (L1) was a resultant 1.01 and (L3) 0.6634, or about 101% and 66% of approximate annual
earnings per capita. (See appendix B chart 2.4 and appendix H, graph 2.5)
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Courting, dating, marriage market values systems and the United States
What of western culture’s marriage customs or traditions. Does a relative local marriage
market gender equity value system exist, in some form, within the developed world, within the
U.S.? Does America have a bride price system, a dowry system or a socio-expectational gender
neutral marriage market value system? Furthermore, was there any difference between U.S.
traditional expectational memes and real world practice?
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MMGEVS estimations will include formative conjugal society related expense items;
considered normative pursuant to coupling observances in America; courtship, engagement ring,
wedding ceremony and honeymoon expenses. Relative local U.S. social expectations, or gross
values, and approximated real world values, net values, will be used just as with India and China.
The intent is to provide two MMGEVS ratings data sets for each sample country. Gross
MMGEVS ratings will be a result of associated normative gender specific expectations: Net
MMGEVS ratings will be a result of normative approximated real world practices. What are the
base social expectations and what are the actual expenses incurred as a percentage of annual
earnings per capita?
What of courting costs, dating, do they represent a gender specific socio-expectational
flow, in theory or in practice? The average length of engagement in America was reported at
about fourteen months and seventeen months (The Knot, 2011; People, 2007). Whereas the male
initially incurred the bulk of dating expenses, these expenses were generally shared more evenly
as a relationship progressed. Further evidence suggests that individuals spend as much or more
money prepping themselves for a date, both male and female; on clothing, hair, makeup and so
forth (Whitelocks, 2014). Consequently, the expense of courting will be excluded; the expense
was found to be an approximate socio-expectational and real world gender neutral flow.
Wedding expenses and associated costs remain to be examined.
The cost of the average engagement ring in America was reported at $2,311 (Staff Amex,
2014). Further, American Express Spending & Savings Tracker (2014) reported an average
engagement ring cost at $2410, and in the upper price range the average cost increased to $5,658
(as cited in Lit, Feb. 3). Max, (2014) reported that only about 16% of engagement ring costs
were $5,000 or more (pg.1). Pardes (2014) added, of some 1500 adults surveyed about 25%
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reported ring costs of $2,000 to $4,999, with some 38% of engagement ring cost at $1,000
dollars or less; the most common price range (Feb, 10). (See appendix C, chart 3.1)
U.S. social expectations charged the male with the engagement ring expense traditionally,
a male to female socio-expectational flow (Staff E, 2013; The Knot, 2014). However, Hill (2013)
reported that real world practice resulted in about 73% of grooms paying for the engagement ring
themselves (pg. 1). Marcus (2013) cited a poll of more than 12,000 respondents with 55%
expecting the male to pay for the ring while the other 45% would be willing to share the cost (pg.
1). These will be the engagement ring expense related figures used for adjusted net U.S.
MMGEVS ratings assessments; as an overall positive economic transfer from the male social
construct towards the female social construct. (See appendix C, chart 3.11)
In addition to these costs there is the wedding itself. The average cost of a wedding in
2012 was reported at about $27,600, while a median was calculated at $10,000 (Oremus, 2013
pg. 2). Staff C (2014) reported the average cost of a wedding in America at $25,200, and added
that most weddings cost less than $10,000. Staff W put the number at $28,671 (2014). While The
Knot (2011) reported wedding cost at $26, 984; from a survey of more than 18,000 married
couples. Just as within India and China significant regional variance was common within
America (The Knot, 2011; Reich, 2014). (See appendix D, chart 3.2).
What of real world practices, how much of this expense follows the U.S.’ normative
marriage market values systems’ gender specific expense related traditions? DollarSense (199697) reported that although wedding expense responsibility; whom was expected to pay for what,
was fluid and evolving, traditional expectations predominantly centered on the bride’s parents
(pg. 1). Tradition aside, the average bride and groom would reportedly pay for their wedding
about 32% of the time, with the bride’s parents covering the expense some 19% of the time
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(Sardone, 2011). Further, 15% of wedding costs were reportedly shared by the bride, the groom
and their parents. Finally some 36% of wedding expense responsibilities remained undefined
(Sardone, 2011).
In addition, Lin (2012) reported “…45% of the wedding was paid for by the bride's
parents, 42%... by the bride and groom, and 12%... by the groom's parents” (pg. 1). Further, of
couples who did pay for their own wedding 13% were reported to have paid the entire cost
themselves (Lin, 2012). (See appendix D, chart 3.21)
The cost of the average honeymoon will also be included. XO Group (2011) reported the
average honeymoon expense at approximately $4,400; with a low range average of about $2300,
an upper average of $6,000, and a more affluent price range average of about $10,000. Staff T
(2013) reported an average of between $2,000 and $5,000, with about one third spending $5,000
to $10,000. (See appendix E, chart 3.3).
What are the gender specific social expectations associated with honeymoons, and what
are the approximated real world gender specific flows? XO Group (2011) reported that about
62% of honeymooners paid for most of their own honeymoon expenses (+90%) and 14% used a
honeymoon registry; similar to a bridal registry. While Travelguard (2012) reported the number
at about 61%; additionally, some 14% of couples were reported to have used a honeymoon
registry to pay expenses (pg. 1). Finally, Williams (2008) noted that some 70% of couples paid
for their own honeymoon. These values will be used for net adjusted MMGEVS ratings data
estimates. (See appendix E, chart 3.1)
In addition an average of three sets of economic range values will be determined for the
United States. A lower level income (L1), mid-level income (L2) and an upper level income (L3)
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will be used; that level of income at which America was demographically split into three groups;
the mid-point of each income group, of each 1/3 will be used.
Approximately 1/2 of Americans (sex combined) reportedly made less than $19,000
annually, and the other half made more. Lower 1/3 (L1) income level was $7,900, and the upper
1/3 (L3) was $47,000 (My Percent, 2014; White, Gebeloff & Ford, 2012). (See appendix E, chart
3.4)
Gross MMGEVS ratings for the U.S. follow. Gross average partner price in the U.S. for
the middle 1/3 income range (L2) was a resultant 0.5408. Again this value represents a female to
male socio-expectational flow, an effective groom price. The gross unadjusted MMGEVS rating
for the lower 1/3 income level in the U.S. (L1) was a resultant 0.7405, and the upper 1/3 income
level rating (L3) was 0.1918. These values represent a percentage of annual income per capita as
well. (L3) represents about 19% of annual individual per capita earnings approximately, (L1) at
0.7045 represents a groom price of approximately 74% of annual per capita earnings, with (L2)
rating at about 54% of APCI. (See appendix F, chart 3.5).
Resultant adjusted net MMGEVS ratings data for the U.S. follow. The mid-level income
(L2) net rating was 0.2370. With a lower income level value (L1) rating of 0.3220, and an upper
income value rating (L3) of 0.0998. Again, these ratings represent U.S. marriage market values
system’s approximate adjusted net gender specific real world flows as percentages of annual
adjusted per capita income; L1 ± 32%, L2 ± 24% and L3 ± 10%. (See appendix F, chart 3.6 and
appendix I, graph 4.0)
Conclusions:
Do marriage market gender equity value systems ratings coincide with UN gender
inequality index ratings? Is there any semblance of correlation with the MMGEVS data and the
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UNGII 2012 data? It would appear that some potential correlation may be in evidence. (See
appendix J, graph 5.1)
India scored a net 0.610, China scored a 0.213, and the U.S. scored a 0.256 on the UNGII;
a lower value represented greater gender equity while a higher value represented greater levels of
gender inequality. In addition, these values presented China, the U.S. and India as patriarchal
social constructs. These were the official UN Gender Inequality Index ratings for India, China
and America. MMGEVS ratings per this study result with India’s (L1) gross and net ratings of
6.0 and 5.61, (L2) 5.0 and 4.65, and (L3) gross and net ratings of 4.0 and 3.74.
India had the highest MMGEVS ratings; with a gross average cost of a partner in India
equaling some 4 to 6 times annual individual earnings. Like the UNGII, a higher rating
represents greater gender disparity, unlike the UNGII the MMGEVS rating specifically
represents potential gender inequity within the various relative local worldwide marriage market
values systems.
In addition, India was officially ranked 160th of the more than 200 plus countries that
participate in the UNGII, which represented a significant level of gender inequality as compared
with both China and the U.S. (UNGII, 2012). China had ranked ahead of America at 35th
internationally, with the U.S. ranking 42nd internationally. How do these data compare with
MMGEVS ratings data? (See appendix J, graph 5.1)
The U.S. had the lowest net and gross MMGEVS ratings; with a gross L1 of 0.74 and a net
of 0.32. While China had MMGEVS ratings of -1.5 and -1.0, these represent L1 gross and L1 net
ratings: The negative value denotes a net opposite gender specific socio-expectational flow, as
compared to both the U.S. and India, a male to female gender specific flow. China’s MMGEVS
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ratings could in theory represent potential gender inequity for the male within Chinese society,
with regards to relative local marriage market values systems.
None the less China had been reported as a patriarchal society, and the UNGII data
concluded likewise. However, it is possible that China’s negative MMGEVS ratings represent a
potential connection to China’s lower gender inequality index rating, as compared to the U.S.
and India?
China and America were much closer together on both the UNGII and the MMGEVS
surveys. While China bested the U.S. on the UNGII ratings, the U.S. had bested China on the
MMGEVS ratings, potentially. This made China and or the U.S. possible outliers within the two
data sets. Again, a zero on both the UNGII and the MMGEVS scales would represent
fundamental gender equality. (See appendix J, graph 5.1)
Discussion
What does any of this mean? Of what significance is marriage to the human being, as
individuals, as couples and as larger collectives, as societies, pursuant to worldwide gender
inequality issues? Can relative local marriage market values systems (MMGEVS) ratings be seen
as potential predictors for gender specific long term overall wellbeing, a social predictor?
The dowry system itself was a social marker of considerable significance (Srinivasan &
Lee, 2004). In addition, dowry, or groom price, was seen as a family investment, in a daughter’s
future (Bhat & Halli, 1999). Whereas women could benefit from the dowry system, to some
extent, women continue to bear the brunt of the cultural or social difficulties associated with its
practice (Banerjee, 2013).
Banerjee (2013) suggested “Dowry death might simply be a result of several factors
including marriage patterns (especially hypergamy) …economic dependency of women and

MARRIAGE & GENDER INEQUALITY

19

cultural norms” (pg. 41). Amin & Bajracharya (2011) wrote “In particular, the evaluation of
women’s and men’s worth in the marriage market in terms of dowry or bride-price may have…
significant implications for their well-being as adults and for gender equity” (pg. 2).
Furthermore, dowry hyperinflation is being experienced within India’s marriage market.
Putting the commoners, the vast majority of the populace, the women and the men of modest
means, into a very difficult socio-cultural bind (Bhat & Halli, 1999). Banerjee (2013) noted “the
size of the dowry was designed to maintain or further the societal status of families… which had
…transitioned into a ‘groom price’ (Menski, 1998)” (pg. 35).
Subsequently, dowry related violence has been increasing significantly as the practice has
become both more universal and more expensive (Banerjee, 2013). Babu and Babu (2011)
reported that dowry related deaths and dowry-related suicides had risen 74% and 31% from 1995
to 2007 (pg. 38). In addition, Banerjee (2013) reported a 59% increase in overall crimes against
women in India from 2001 to 2011 (pg. 34). Gentleman (2006) noted “An average of one dowry
death is reported every 77 minutes according to the National Crime Record Bureau” (pg. 1).
Furthermore, many cases of dowry violence, and or violence against women, remain unreported
due to various cultural inhibitions much like within China and the U.S. (Srinivasan & Lee, 2004;
Anderson, 2007).
China, which had been reported as having a preference for male children, traditionally, is
experiencing issues not unlike India. A shortage of marriage age appropriate women had resulted
in significant marriage market inflation, a bride price inflation.
Might the male construct be trapped within these confines as well? Those who wish to
marry, start a family and perpetuate the line as it were, would have to pay as much as a years’
worth, or many years’ worth of earnings in order to secure a partner (Jiang & Sanchez-
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Barricarte, 2012; Jiang, Guo, Li & Feldman, 2013; Bhat & Halli, 1999). These are the
commoners of American, Indian and Chinese society, not the wealthy, or the newly emerging
middle classes but the vast majority of the respective populaces. Zhang (2000) reported “Though
there was no significant difference in bride price paid by households of various economic
groups… richer households paid higher bride prices, but… it was not the poorest who paid the
lowest” (pg. 63).
Bride price practice has had, and continues to have an adverse effect on the average
Chinese male’s ability to secure a partner, to afford a bride. Jiang et al (2013) added “For the
present and in the future, there are and will be millions of young males who are unable to find
brides in China (Tuljapurkar et al. 1995; Poston and Glover 2005; Attané 2006; Li et al. 2006;
Jiang et al. 2007)” (pg. 135).
This is true within the American and the Indian marriage markets. The lower the income
bracket the higher the relative local partner price. These costs represent significant social barriers
to marriage within each of the sample countries. Whereas, for the wealthiest in China, India or
America these social expectational expenses represent each populations lowest relative local
partner price, as a percentage of individual annual income.
Partner price in China was less expensive than partner price in India while it was more
expensive than in America, about twice as much on average approximately. America had the
lowest resultant MMGEVS ratings of the three sample countries; as a percentage of annual
income. Although, China had a reverse flow, a male to female flow, the overall gender specific
flow differential was larger than that of the U.S.’.
Does this explain the difference in ratings between the U.S. and China, on the two scales,
the UNGII and the MMGEVS? Was bride price in China potentially effecting overall gender
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inequality within Chinese society, was it acting as a counter force to long established patriarchy?
China had rated better than America on the UNGII, meaning that the female within Chinese
society enjoyed greater levels of overall gender equality, than did the female in America. None
the less, the number one cause of injury to a woman in China was from an intimate partner (XU
et al, 2005).
The U.S. marriage market values systems; the U.S.’ culturally accepted and widely
practiced marriage related norms would appear to be a system which empowers and condemns.
But, like China and India would do so based on normative socially accepted gender specific
constructs. In addition, it would appear that this conjugal patriarchal power system may be
capable of extending its influence far beyond the confines of the conjugal social construct,
beyond the confines of the marriage itself.
Coontz (2004) wrote “For all socio economic classes, marriage was the most important
marker of adulthood and respectability” (pg.4). Further, it was said to be an effective way of
extracting labor from the young, a means of consolidating basic survival activities, economic,
security, and perpetuation. What of marriage in modern times? De Mor & Van Zanden (2009)
expressed that “…a household was a cooperative economic unit aimed at the fulfilment of the
physical and emotional needs of its members, and characterized by certain inequalities” sexual,
generational (pg. 3).
Marriage as an institution in the west had gone through many changes throughout history.
Everitt (2012) expressed the importance of strategic alliances; bonds of family, bonds of trust, as
the foundations for ever larger alliances, and ever larger strategic collectives- economics and
security. Politics would not be far behind, the politics of wealth, nor would religious
consecration of the marriage construct (circa 11th & 12th centuries). Modern traditional Judeo-
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Christian wedding vows were credited to Thomas Cramer circa 1549; to have and to hold, for
better or for worse, for richer or poorer and the like (Everitt, 2012).
The history of marriage in the United States was one of “utilitarian reasoning” as Cott
(2000) put it (pg. 10). One in which the founding fathers saw Christian consent based
monogamous marriage as a natural extension of this new republican form of governance,
government by choice. Cott (2000) continued that it was “…this thinking which propelled the
analogy between the two forms of consensual union into the republican nation’s selfunderstanding and identity” (pg. 10).
It is true that president Obama had said America was no longer just a Christian nation
(Obama, 2008). However, some 77 percent of Americans in a recent Gallup poll identified
themselves with a Christian religion (Newport, 2012).
Christian based consensual marriage did come to dominate the United States. Many of the
utilitarian aspects of this construct would prove useful to society at large, more stable
environments for children, effective economic partnering, increased productivity and the like.
Marriage had effectively increased the man’s, the husband’s power both in society and in the
relationship. The woman would give up her name, her identity to be called by his name; this was
legally defined as “coverture”, with the wife being called the “feme-covert” (Cott, 2000 pg. 11).
Furthermore, the wife could not own property, conduct legal affairs, sign contracts and the like.
The husband did in fact become his wife’s legal and political representative, effectively
“…disenfranchising her” as Cott (2000) put it (pg.12).
This was reminiscent of the ancient Roman “house-father” who ruled with absolution;
none in the household had any legal rights, not children, not wives, not slaves (as cited in
Westermarck, 1968 pg. 137). Whereas it would be the man and the woman consenting
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ostensibly, it was religion, politics, and society setting the rules for the construction of, or for the
context of consent; utilitarian, patriarchal (Cott, 2000, Westermarck, 1968).
Marriage was certainly about money, patriarchy and power around the world, just as it had
been throughout history (Coontz, 2004). Lamont (2014) noted “…traditional gender ideologies
remain remarkably resilient, as courtship conventions symbolizing men’s dominant,
breadwinning status stubbornly persist (Eaton and Rose 2011)” (pg. 190). Further, Christianson
(2011) reported on gender specific perceptions regarding the financial prudence of a potential
partner and noted that 61% percent of men held a positive view of a thrifty blind date; she was
“…smart and sexy”, while 66% of women held a negative view; he was “…a turnoff”, and an
additional 17% of women found the anonymous thrift minded male boring (pg. 1).
Women have had, historically speaking, a much better chance of marrying up, as
compared to men. Patriarchy worked to their favor, for some of them. Until recently however,
nowadays more women, than men, are marrying down (Wang, 2014). The marriage market was
fluid. Yet patriarchal expectations remained none the less. Lamont (2014) noted “The majority of
the women expressed a preference for conventional courtship behaviors and expected men to ask
and pay for the first date, confirm the exclusivity of the relationship, and propose marriage” (pg.
197). Is there a feedback loop in effect, potentially seeding more power to the relative local
social male construct?
Is the female consenting to subordination, by way of her choosing to participate according
to established local customs, and is this a response, conscious or unconscious, to local relative
marriage market gender equity values systems, or relative local coupling observances social
expectancies? Is the marriage minded female either socially expected to and or willingly
acquiescing to normative coupling observance behavioral patterns thereby signaling to the male,
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as well as to society at large; religion, friends, family, mentors, her own potential willing
subservience?
Lamont (2014) reported “Although women assert that personal choice governs their
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courtship behavior, their efforts to conceal nonconforming behavior indicated that gendered
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expectations guide their decision making” (pg.207). Gross MMGEVS ratings or gender specific
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traditional expectations of the marriage observance are appurtenant to this type of study; given
the power of socio-expectational influence. In addition to the net adjusted approximated real
world specific expenditures incurred and by whom. Is this the origin of the potential feedback
loop, the power of socio-expectational memes?
What if anything might this data portend? There is the possibility of error or biases within
the data sets. There is also the possibility that any potential preliminary correlation might prove
to be unsubstantiated in the future. None the less, I believe it to mean that perhaps a closer look
at the cause and effect potential of relative local coupling observances, of marriage market
values systems worldwide, including America, to be in order.
Further, these results show the potential for this type of an analysis pursuant to addressing
gender inequality issues worldwide. Many obstacles prevent the collection and assessment of
meaningful data pursuant to gender inequality worldwide, as noted by the United Nations. I
believe this type of an assessment may prove to be beneficial.
The UNWW (2010) report noted “Increasing the capacity to produce reliable and timely…
gender statistics, remains a formidable challenge for many countries” (pg. XII). The same
concern previous UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan expressed five years earlier in the UNWW
(2005) report “Ten years after the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action,
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the lack of reliable national statistics on gender issues persists in many parts of the world” (pg.
III).
It has become common knowledge that women lagged behind men in nearly every
statistical category everywhere around the world (UNWW, 2012-2013). Women make less
money, work longer hours, own fewer assets and are faced with greater levels of gender specific
violence than men (UNWW, 2012-2013).
Although levels and rates of violence against women may have presented considerable
local variability, the violence was universal and ongoing. The UNWW (2010) reported “…such
abuse occurs in all countries or areas without exception” (pg. X). Gender wealth and or wage
inequality is universal and is ongoing as well. Tijdens & Van Klaveren (2012) in an ITUC report
on gender pay inequality noted “No significant progress has been made in closing the global
gender pay gap for over a decade” (pg. C).
The roots of gender inequality appear to run deep. How can this be a simple matter of
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relative local cultural differences when it is both a worldwide and a universal ongoing
phenomenon? I believe we ought to look to local relative cultural coupling observances’
traditional memes. To marriage market values systems, and to the potential role that they may
play in reinforcing widely acknowledged and systemic worldwide gender inequality.
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Appendix A: India data figures
Chart 1.1 India dowry price data; as a percentage of annual income
Karnataka
Uttar Pradesh dowry cost
Uttar Pradesh dowry cost
Tamil Nadu dowry cost
Gross dowry cost

L1 Rural
6x
3x
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8x
24x/4n
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L2 (L1+L3)/2)
L3: 4x
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L3 Urban
D. 4x
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Legend: x  approximate annual per capita income, ie 1x would equal 100% of annual earnings

Chart 1.2 India MMGEVS data- Gross unadjusted
Gross MMGEVS rating F>M

L1 Rural
6.0

L2 Average (L1,L2) L3 Urban
5.0
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Chart 1.3 India MMGEVS ratings data, net adjusted, approximated real world practice
Gross MMGEVS rating F>M
Real world practice
Net MMGEVS rating F>M

L1 Rural
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93.5%
5.61

L2 Average (L1,L2)
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Legend: x = approximate annual income,  1   100%    !"

L3 Urban
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Appendix B: China data figures
Chart 2.1 China bride price (BP) data, gross cost, and approximated real world net cost (Yuan)
Gross bride price
Real world payment 1 ±50%
Real world payment 2 ±50%
(rwp1+rwp2)/ 2n = net bride price
Net bride price
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L3
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+14,250 y
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*This value represents an approximated average of the 50% that did not pay full bride price
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Chart 2.2 China per capita annual income (Yuan)
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Chart 2.3 China MMGEVS ratings, gross unadjusted, as a percentage of annual income
*A negative MMGEVS rating value denotes a female to male gender specific flow
Bride Price
AIPC
Gross MMGEVS rating

L1
15,000y
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L2
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Legend: x  approximate annual per capita income, ie 1x would equal 100% of annual earnings

Chart 2.4 China MMGEVS; 90% real world practice adjustment, adjusted net bride price data
*A negative MMGEVS rating value denotes a female to male gender specific flow
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Appendix C: U.S. data figures
Chart 3.1 U.S. engagement ring price data, M/F gross socio-expectational flow (US dollars) M>F

Engagement ring cost
Engagement ring cost
Engagement ring cost
Subtotal
Total
Gross E ring cost

L1
$1,000.00

$1,000.00

L2
$2,311.00
+ $2,410.00
+ $2,000.00
= $6,721.00/3n
= $2,240.33
$2,240.33

L3
$5,658.00
+ $5,000.00
+ $4,999.00
= $15,657.00/3n
= $5,219.00
$5,219.00

Chart 3.11 U.S. engagement ring price data, net adjusted cost, approximated real world practice
(US dollars) M>F

Real world practice
Subtotal
Total
Engagement ring cost
Subtotal
Net E ring cost

L1
55% + 75% /2n
= 128%/2n
64%
$1,000.00
$1,000.00/ 64%
$640.00

L2
55% + 75% /2n
= 128%/2n
64%
$2,240.33
$2,240.33/ 64%
$1,433.81

L3
55% + 75% /2n
= 128%/2n
64%
$5,219.00
$5,219.00/ 64%
$3,340.16
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Appendix D: U.S. data figures
Chart 3.2 U.S. gross wedding price data, gross socio-expectational flow (U.S. Dollars) F>M
L1
$10,000.00

Gross wedding cost
Gross wedding cost
Gross wedding cost
Gross wedding cost
Gross wedding cost
F>M
Engagement ring gross
M>F
Gross adjusted wedding cost F>M
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-$2,240.33
$16,316.17
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ng price data, net adjusted cost, approximated real world practice
(US dollars) F>M
Real world practice
Subtotal
Total
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Subtotal
Net wedding cost F>M
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=77%/2n
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Appendix E U.S. data figures
Chart 3.3 U.S. gross honeymoon price data, gross socio-expectational flow (US dollars) M>F

Honeymoon cost
Honeymoon cost
Honeymoon cost
Honeymoon cost
Subtotal
Gross honeymoon cost

L1
$2,300.00
+$2,000.00

L2
$4,400.00
+$2,000.00
+$5,000.00

$4,300.00/2n
$2,150.00

$11,400.00/3n
$3,800.00

L3
$6,000.00
+$10,000.00
+$5,000.00
+$10,000.00
=$31,000.00/4n
$7,750.00

Chart 3.31 U.S. net honeymoon price data, net adjusted cost, approximated real world practice
(US dollars) M>F

Real world practice
Real world practice
Real world practice
Subtotal
Subtotal
Subtotal
Net real world practice
Gross honeymoon cost
Subtotal
Net honeymoon cost

L1
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+-62%
+-70%
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=-69%
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$2,150.00/31%
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L2
61%+14%
+62%
+70%
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=69%
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$3,800.00
$3,800.00/31%
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Chart 3.4 U.S. annual per capita income (US dollars)
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$7,900
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L3
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L3
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31%
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$7,750.00/31%
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Appendix F: U.S. Data figures
Chart 3.5 U.S. gross MMGEVS ratings data- Gross unadjusted (US dollars)

Gross wedding cost
F>M
Gross E. ring cost
M>F
Gross honeymoon cost M>F
Net flow
F>M
APC income
Gross MMGEVS rating

L1
$9,000.00
-$1,000.00
-$2,150.00
$5,850.00
$7,900.00
0.7405x

L2
$16,316.17
-$2,240.33
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L3
$21,894.00
-$5,219.00
-$7,750.00
$9,015.00
$47,000.00

0.5408x

0.1918x

Legend: x  approximate annual per capita income, ie 1x would equal 100% of annual earnings

Chart 3.6 U.S. net MMGEVS ratings data, net adjusted, approximated real world practice
(US dollars)
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Net flow
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Legend: x  approximate annual per capita income, ie 1x would equal 100% of annual earnings
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Appendix G: India MMGEVS gross and net ratings, and UNGII rating
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Appendix H: China MMGEVS gross and net ratings, and UNGII rating
Graph 2.5 China combined date, MMGEVS & UNGII
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Appendix I: U.S. MMGEVS gross and net ratings, and UNGII rating
Graph 4.0 U.S. combined date, MMGEVS & UNGII
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Appendix J MMGEVS & UNGII ratings for all sample countries
Graph 5.1 All MMGEVS ratings data and all UNGII ratings data
Formatted: No underline, Font color: Auto

All Data: MMGEVS & UNGII

A positive value denotes a M>F
F flow, a negative value denotes a F>M flow
Abstract
This study looks at two of humanities oldest and still predominant conventions, throughout the
world; marriage and patriarchy. This work looks at the political economics of predominating
marriage practices, at the socio--expectational power and or economic flows and the existence of
global gender inequality as defined by the United Nations Gender Inequality Index 2012
2012. Could
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there be a potential relationship, some form of correlation, whether cause and effect or the like,
between gender power flow dynamics and the political economics of the world’s various local
coupling observances, or marriage market gender equity values systems? This study concludes
that there would seem to be potentially significant correlation within these two data sets. This
finding merits a more comprehensive look at prevailing global, local cultural marriage
traditions and their potential effect on the prevalence of worldwide gender inequality.
Keywords: marriage market, gender equity, bride price, dowry, groom price, partner price,
marriage market gender equity value system (MMGEVS) United Nations Gender Inequality
Index (UNGII)

Gender equity power flow dynamics, relative local marriage market values systems
and worldwide gender inequality. The United Nations (2000, 2005 & 2010) affirmed that
gender inequality continued to be a significant issue throughout the world (UNWW). “Despite
calls for gender equality, women were significantly under-represented in Governments, political
parties and at the United Nations” as reported by the UNWW (2000, pg. 151). For example, “7
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of 150 elected Heads of State in the world were women, and only 11 of 192 Heads of
Government” (UNWW, 2010 pg. X, para 3).
In an effort to quantify worldwide gender inequality the United Nations had developed the
Gender Inequality Index (2012). This rating, and ranking established a gender inequality score
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based on metrics from several other international studies. The UN (2014) noted “The Gender
Inequality Index is similar in method to the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index
(IHDI). It can be interpreted as a percentage loss to potential human development due to
shortfalls in the dimensions included” (GII-FAQ, 2014). Such as, gender specific levels of access
to society, health, economy, and government.
Not one of the more than 200 participant countries had attained a perfect gender equity
score of zero. Gender equity did not exist anywhere on the planet as rated by the United Nations
Gender Inequality Index (UNGII, 2012).
This work will investigate marriage and worldwide gender inequality; the gender power
flow dynamics of culturally relevant local coupling observances, of bride price, dowry, courting,
dating or the like, of marriage market values systems worldwide. What if any potential influence
might these various coupling rituals have on predominant worldwide gender inequality? Whereas
the various marriage associated observances differed considerably throughout the world,
marriage had remained a worldwide phenomenon, as did gender inequality.
The glass slipper and the glass ceiling, were they one and the same? Could they be socially
manufactured derivations of predominating gender constructs, which had emerged from the
many various cultural coupling observances’ deeply embedded traditions? Were these various
cultural coupling observances, or, relative cultural marriage equity market values systems,
serving to perpetuate gender inequality worldwide?
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Three fundamental principles represent the theoretical grounding for this research. First,
that women were, or that the female gender construct was, subordinate to that of the male gender
construct. Second, that both men and women were, for all intents and purposes, a commodity.
Finally, that the commodification of men and women through the marriage market, represented a
significant social force capable of influencing and perpetuating worldwide systemic gender
inequality.
John Locke (circa 1690) exampled man and woman, husband and wife as the first civil
society: he expressed the idea that “Conjugal society was made by a voluntary compact between
man and woman” (as cited in MacPherson, 1980, pg. 43). In this earliest of societies Locke did
cast the male as the leader over the female. A western centric view point was one of democratic
ideals, that of a voluntary or equitably agreed upon conjugal society and patriarchy.
Whether or not the many various conjugal societies were or were not voluntary in nature,
and to what extent was not at issue for this specific research. At issue was the significance of the
observance itself, of relative local marriage market gender equity values systems worldwide
pursuant to global gender inequality. This research will not attempt to define voluntary conjugal
societies excepting as follows. The persistence of said observance(s) in any given collective,
whether official or unofficial, would for the sake of this research render these various coupling
observances more or less voluntary in nature.
I would use available data pursuant to the establishment of relative marriage market
gender equity value systems worldwide. Various select countries would be used for the sake of
comparing and contrasting with this works duly established marriage market gender equity value
scale (MMGEVS) data with the United Nations Gender Inequality Index (UNGII, 2012) data.
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Within the UN Gender Inequality Index (UNGII) there were some potential issues owing
to possible western biases. The majority of the countries that scored lower, i.e. better; those
collectives which afforded greater levels of female access or equality within their societies,
according to the UNGII, were predominantly westernized; capitalist, democratic, developed.
Furthermore, the countries or regions which ranked at the lower end of the UNGII scale tended
to come from developing, underdeveloped or undeveloped areas primarily. In addition, different
cultures could have and did have different values, different priorities. Human rights, women’s
rights, gender equity and or women’s access to society did have very different meanings in the
many different social collectives around the globe.
The UN report continued with a mention of some limitations of its own data; the UNGII
was far from perfect, far from exacting and was limited in scope by numerous factors. Such as,
using national governance participation rates rather than local governance participation rates in
the index and lacking a broader internationally agreed upon set of standards with which to work
on many issues. These and many other difficulties limited the type, the quality and the amount of
data collectable, and or useable. None the less the UNGII represented best available data
pursuant to a practical measurement of worldwide gender inequality, using metrics which had
been agreed to by a large number of countries throughout the world. This data would
subsequently be compared with resultant MMGEVS data.
I would establish specific relative local coupling observance prevalence within each
preliminary sample country selected for this work. Using these data I would then establish a
marriage market gender equity value scale (MMGEVS): How much for the woman, or how
much for the man, a partner price? This would be based on socio-expectational economic
transfers measured as a percentage of individual annual earnings per capita within each sample
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country. Finally this data would be compared with data from the UNGII 2012 data. Could gender
inequality data, as measured by the UNGII, be shown to potentially relate to resultant marriage
market gender equity value range data, or to worldwide marriage market gender values systems?
What was the relative marriage market gender equity value range within each sample
country? What was the relative gender inequality rating of each sample country, as per the
UNGII 2012? And what if any potential corroboration could be found within these two data sets?
Participant countries were selected based on where they were rated on the UNGII 2012
scale; a broad spectrum of ratings was desired, as well as the availability of sufficient data, the
specific type of relative local cultural coupling observances practiced; whether bride price,
dowry, westernized dating. Population size was important in that this research was attempting to
look at larger worldwide trends. Further, a broad cross section of governance models, social and
economic developmental levels, religious practices, and belief systems was desired. I would use
India, China and the United States as my preliminary sample countries for this study.
Could relative cultural variance within these coupling observances; whether our own
familiar westernized traditional dating and marriage observances, eastern bride price observances
or dowry observances or the like; relative cultural marriage equity market value systems, be
shown to correlate with relative global gender inequality worldwide? In any given society in
which gender equity (women’s rights) was rated, whether lower or higher, could relative cultural
marriage equity market value be shown to potentially correspond with the various levels of
gender equity as tracked and rated by the United Nations 2012 Gender Inequality Index
(UNGII)?
India will be presented first, China second and the United States third; with respects to
culturally specific coupling observances and gender specific economic socio-expectational
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flows; as a percentage of annual income within each sample country. These data sets will be used
to establish MMGEVS for each sample country. The forth section will be a comparison of the
two data sets: The UNGII rating for each of the three sample countries, and the MMGEVS
ratings for each sample country. In the final section I will present discussion and conclusion(s).
Marriage equity market gender value range, India
India, dowry payment and marriage market values systems
India was described as a patriarchal society in which “…the powerless position of the
woman appeared to be at the core…” (Banerjee, 2014, p.?). The Indian marriage market was
dominated by dowry payment (Sautmann 2009), (Gentleman, 2006), (Bhat & Halli, 1999),
(Anderson, 2007). This was a reverse form of bride price (groom price) whereby the bride, and
or the bride’s family, pay the groom and or the groom’s family. The marriage itself would not
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take place until or unless the dowry had been paid and even then if the dowry was not deemed
sufficient, following the marriage, more would be demanded and or expected.
Furthermore, dowry custom had maintained strong cultural support within India. Dowry
had in fact become a commonly observed marriage custom in India affecting some “…93-94%
of marriages, Anderson (2007a)” reported Sautmann (2009 pg. 6 para 3). This despite efforts
from government; which had officially prohibited Dowry in 1961, local social activists, feminist
organizations and the like (Sautmann, 2009, ; Banerjee, 2014).
The relative marriage market gender equity value scale data for India would seem to have
been influenced by an overabundance of women. Which This had resulted in bride price
deflation, or groom price hyperinflation; as opposed to a shortage of women and an associated
bride price hyper-inflation in China’s marriage market values system (in Jian et al., 2012) (Billig,
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1992; Bhat & Halli, 1999). This was the result of a marriage squeeze in India (Rao, 1993),
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(Sautmann, 2009) (Bhat & Halli, 1999).
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While demographically males did outnumber females, this was not true of marriage age
appropriate females, who actually outnumbered marriage age appropriate males. A growing
population and shifting economic demographics were among the causes of the rise in practice
and price of Dowry in India (Bhat and Halli, 2011), (Anderson, 2007). Reporting on several
regions throughout India, Anderson (2007) declared that while exacting figures were not
available dowries payments would generally equate to “several times more than total annual
household income…” (pg. 155, para 4).
Income from within various regions of India varied considerably this study worked to
mitigate these incongruences by using an annual income based comparison of the various regions
to establish a relative marriage market gender equity value (MMGEVS) for each sample country.
For this study the average annual earnings per capita results represented a base value sought for
all selected participant sample countries.
Anderson (2007) reported that the rural region of Uttar Pradesh’s average dowry payment
was 7 to 3 times the average annual income of the males in the area. Karnataka averaged 6 times
the per capita male annual income of the region. Tamil Nadu were reported as having dowries 8
times annual per capita income while Delhi was reported at 4 time’s annual per capita income
(see appendix chart 1.15). Central rural India was reported at 68% of total net household worth;
while this value will not be used due to the difficulty in quantifying this in terms of per capita or
per individual annual earnings this does represent a significant socio-expectational gender
specific expense.
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In addition, an average range value will be used for three income categories. Lower
median average income, median average income and mean or upper average income will be used
in order to establish an estimated MMGEVS across various income levels.
India’s median MMGEVS rating was a 5.34. This value represented a net gender specific
female to male flow, a dowry payment, or groom price payment of 5.334 times approximate
regional annual per capita earnings. With a lower median income level value range average of
6.3334 and a mean upper level income value range average of 3.5; or about 6.34 and 3.5 times
approximate regional annual earnings per capita (See appendix A- chart 1.2).
China, bride price and marriage market values systems
China had been described as a patrilineal society having a patrilocal marriage system- a
bride price system (Jiang & Sanchez-Barricarte, 2012, ; Zhang, 2000). Bride price was a wellaccepted practice in Chinese society. This owing as far back as the Zhou dynasty; circa 1046
BCE to 246 BCE (Britannica, 2013). Jiang and Sanchez (2012) reported “From that period on,
the role and function of the bride price has never weakened” (pg. 2). It has in fact not only
remained a central core of marriage culture in China but has increased in prevalence as market
reforms have been instituted (Zhang, 2000). In addition, there would be no marriage, no official
engagement or the like, unless or until the bride price was paid in full and in advance (Jiang &
Sanchez, 2012).
‘“The prevalence of bride price in China was closely related to the surplus of males and
the lack of females’ females” (Caldwell, Reddy, & Caldwell, 1983, p.?; Chen, 2004). “... in the
marriage market, the side of oversupply will compete for marriage at a cost” as Jiang & Sanchez
(2012) noted (pg.3, para 1). Basic supply and demand; females were in short supply, demand
was exceedingly high.
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Jiang and Sanchez- Barricarte (2012) added “A preference for sons and discrimination
against daughters had long existed in China” (pg. 3). Efforts had been made by some Chinese to
move beyond bride price observances, affording a more equitable role for the female. None the
less, bride price had been increasing steadily in China regardless (Zhang 2000, ; Jiang &
Sanchez, 2012).
Reporting on some of the local outlying rural provinces and or Villages in China, Jiang et
aland Sanchez (2012) and Zhang (2000) provided evidence of overall bride price; in terms of
relative cost, and for its existence as a commonly accepted social function. This data would be
averaged across other sectors of China with a final value, or average approximate marriage
market gender equity value range being the result. This was not meant to be a definitive value,
but merely a comparison based value range.
Relative bride price in Zhaocun village of Gansu Province was reported at approximately
15,720 Yuan by the end of the 1990s, up from 2069 in the 1980s. Xiajia village of Heilongjiang
Province, China was reported at 28,500 Yuan. In addition Zhang (2000) writing on northern
Chinese villages provided “In the early 1980s villagers spent 3000-4000 Yuan to arrange a son's
marriage, while at the time of the study, ten years later, they needed to spend 15,000-26,000
Yuan” (pg. 62).
Finally, in computing the numbers used for comparison with the UNGII data, rising dowry
price (groom price) was taken into account. Zhang (2012) reported that while around a forth of
dowries brought into the marriage were at least equal to the average bride price payment during
the 1980s, the earlier years of reform efforts in China, this number had grown to approximately
fifty percent by the end of the 1990s.
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Consequently, given corroborating data sets ranging from approximately 15,000 to 28,500
Yuan, these figures will be used, following an adjustment pursuant to dowry or groom price
increases. Resulting data represented relative effective bride price range value (MMGEVR)
minimum and maximum values. The resultant value range (7500 Yuan and 14,250 Yuan) would
then be adjusted as a percentage of the annual income of the populace at large, as reported by the
Chinese Family Panel Studies, at Peking University (as cited in Wong, 2013). (See appendix Bchart 2.1).
Which This for China was around 2100 US dollars or about 13,122 Yuan (Wong, 2013).
The average annual income in Shanghai, a large industrial coastal province was reported at
29,000 YPY (Yuan per year); while in Gansu, a northern inland province the figure was 11,400
YPY; with 16,247 for an urban family and 9998 YPY for a rural family being reported (Wong,
2013). Therefor these resulting range values, minimum and maximum annual income values
(9,998 YPY to 29,000 YPY) will be used. (See appendix B- chart 2.2).
In addition, an average range value will be used for three income categories. Lower
median average income, median average income and mean or upper average income levels will
be used in order to establish an estimated MMGEVR across various income levels, just as was
done with India.
Individual results for China follow. Average bride price (MMV) was 0.5570 times
approximate annual per capita earnings. With a lower income level value range average of
1.0878 and an upper income value range average of 0.3751 or about 38% percent of approximate
annual earnings. (See appendix B- chart 2.3)
Courting, dating, marriage market values systems and the United States
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What of western culture’s marriage customs or traditions. Did a relative local marriage
market gender equity value system exist, in some form, within the developed world, within the
U.S.? Did America have a bride price system, a dowry system or a socio-expectational gender
neutral marriage market value system, in practice?
MMGEVR estimations would include formative conjugal society related expense items;
considered normative pursuant to coupling observances in America; courtship, engagement ring,
wedding ceremony and honeymoon expenses. Relative local U.S. social expectations versus
relative U.S. social realities would be divided by annual income per capita ([E/R]/I). What were
the actual expenses incurred and or exchanged within the actual practice of the culture in
question? What was the net resultant gender specific marriage related expectational economic
flow relative to annual income?
In addition an average of three sets of economic range values would be used. Lower
median income average, median income average and mean or upper level income average would
be used just as was done with India and China.
The average length of engagement in America was reported at about fourteen months and
seventeen months (The Knot, 2011), (People, 2007). What of courting costs? Whereas the male
would initially incur the bulk of dating expenses, these expenses were generally shared more
evenly as a relationship progressed. Evidence suggested that individuals would spend as much or
more prepping themselves for a date; on clothing, hair, makeup, than they would on the actual
date itself (Whitelocks, 2014). For the sake of this study the expense of courting was excluded;
the expense was found to be more a gender neutral flow. Wedding expenses and associated costs
remained to be examined.
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Cost of the average engagement ring in America was reported at $2,311.00 for 2013 and
$2,100$ for 2006 (Amex staff 2014), (People, 2007). Pardes (2014) cited data from American
Express Spending & Savings Tracker which reported, of some 1500 adults surveyed about 25%
percent expressed $2,000 to $4,999 sufficient, 38 percent intended to spend $1,000 dollars or
less; the most common price range, and in the upper income levels the costs increased
significantly (Feb, 10). Data from Diamondcode.com’s real time diamond ring purchase price
charts corroborated; although, these diamond ring purchase data do not represent engagement
rings exclusively, they do represent an economic demographic purchasing pattern comparable to
that of the (Staff Amex, 2014) data. And lastly, Farrell (2008) denoted the average engagement
ring cost at between $3000.00 and $4000.00 dollars (para 2). These will be the figures used for
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MMGEVR computations; as an overall positive economic transfer from the male social construct
towards the female social construct.. (See appendix C- Chart 3.1).
In addition to these costs there is the wedding ceremony itself. Which This must be
included, in order to maintain relative consistency across sample countries.
The average cost of a wedding in 2012 was $27,427 dollars, while the median was
reported at $16,886 dollars (Oremus, June 12, 2013 pg. 2 para 2). Staff C reported the average
cost of a wedding in America at $25,200, and added that most weddings cost less than $10,000
(2014). Staff W put the number at $28,671 (2014). While The Knot (2011) reported $26, 984;
from its Real Wedding Survey, a survey of more than 18,000 couples who were married in 2010.
And It also noted significant regional variance with NYC as the most expensive region for
marriage at some $70,030 and Utah as the least expensive at around $13,214 (The Knot, 2011).
These will be the figures applied to MMGEVR computations; as an overall positive economic
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transfer, from the female social construct towards the male social construct. (See appendix Cchart 3.2). These figures represented gross socio-expectational expenses.
What of real world practices, how much of this expense followed the U.S.’ normative
marriage market values systems’ gender specific expense related traditions? DollarSense
(1996/97) reported that although wedding expense responsibility; , whom was expected to pay
for what, was fluid and evolving, expectations predominantly centered on the bride’s parents (pg.
1 para 2). Tradition aside, the average bride and groom would pay for the wedding about 32%
percent of the time and the bride’s parents 19% percent of the time (Sardone, 2011). Further,
15% percent of wedding costs were shared by bride, groom and their parents, and some 36%
percent of wedding expense responsibilities remained undefined (Sardone, 2011).
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Lin (2012) cited “…TheKnot.com & WeddingChannel.com 2010 Real Weddings Study,
45% of the wedding was paid for by the bride's parents, 42%... by the bride and groom and
12%... by the groom's parents” (pg. 1 para 4). In addition, of couples who did pay for their own
wedding, some 13% reported to have paid all expenses (Lin, 2011). (See appendix C- chart 3.2).
The cost of the average honeymoon would likewise be included. XO Group (2011)
reported the average honeymoon expense at approximately $4,400, with a low range average of
about $2300.00, an upper average of $6,000.00 and a more affluent range average of about
$10,000.00 dollars. Staff T (2011) reported an average of between $2,000.00 and $5,000.00 with
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about one third spending $5,000.00 to $10,000.00. (See appendix C- chart 3.3).
What were the gender specific social expectations associated with honeymoons, what were
the approximated real world gender specific flows? X O Group (2011) reported that about 62%
of honeymooners paid for most of their own honeymoon expenses (+90%). While Travelguard
(2012) reported the number at about 61%. Additionally, some 14% of couples reportedly had
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used a honeymoon registry to pay expenses (Travelguard, 2012). Finally, Williams (2008) noted
some 70% of couples paid for their own honeymoon. (See appendix C- chart 3.3).
A lower level median, mid-level median income and mean upper level income would be
used; that level of income at which America was demographically split into thirds; the mid-point
of each income group, of each 1/3 would be used. Approximately 49.9% percent of Americans
(sex combined) made less than $19,000 annually and the other approximate 50% made more.
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(See appendix C chart- 3.4).
Resultant MMGEVS data for the U.S. follow. Mid-level median income range MMGEVS
was 0.2234. With a lower income level value range average of 0.4213, and a mean upper income
value range average of 0.0962. Just as with China and India, these data figures represented U.S.
marriage market values system’s approximated net gender specific real world flows as
percentages of annual adjusted per capita income. (See appendix D- chart 3.5).
Conclusions:
Did marriage market gender equity value ranges coincide with gender inequality,
potentially? Was there any potential semblance of correlation with the MMGEVR data and the
UNGII 2012 data? It would appear that some potential correlation may have been in evidence.
India scored a 0.610 respectfully, China scored a 0.213 and the U.S. scored a 0.256: A
lower value represented greater gender equity while a higher value represented greater levels of
gender inequality. These were the official UN Gender Inequality Index ratings for India, China
and America.
In addition, India was officially ranked 160th of the more than 200 plus countries that had
participated, which represented a significantly higher level of gender inequality as compared
with both China and the U.S. (UN Gender, 2012). China had ranked ahead of America at 35th
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internationally, with the U.S. ranking 42nd internationally. How do these data compare with
MMGEVR data? (See appendix E)
The U.S. had the lowest MMGEVS rating, 0.42, compared with India’s 6.34. While China
scored a -1.09. This value denoted a net opposite gender specific socio-expectational flow, a
male to female gender specific flow. Of the three preliminary sample countries India had scored
the highest on the UNGII and the MMGEVS surveys; owing to greater levels of gender inequity
within Indian society in general. China and America were much closer together on both surveys
with China besting the U.S. on the UNGII and the U.S. besting China on the MMGEVS. This
made either China or the U.S. a potential outlier scoring the lowest on the UNGII, of sample
countries. While rating between both India and America within the MMGEVS data,. Zero zero
on both the UNGII and the MMGEVS scales would represent fundamental gender equality. (See
Appendix E).
India had the highest resultant net gender specific socio-expectational flow differential on
the MMGEVS while also having the highest UNGII score- this represented the greatest levels of
gender inequality among sample countries within both studies. These numbers represented a
political economic rating, or a partner price; a groom price or a bride price. In the case of India,
this was a socio-expectational flow from the female construct to the male construct, an effective
groom price. Like India the United State had an effective groom price as well.
Discussion
What could any of this mean? Of what significance was marriage to the human being, as
individuals, as couples and as larger collectives, as societies, pursuant to worldwide gender
inequality issues? Could relative local marriage market values systems, MMGEVS be seen as
potential predictors for gender specific long term overall wellbeing, a social predictor?
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The dowry system itself was a social marker of considerable significance (Srinivasan &
Lee, 2004). In addition, dowry, or groom price, was seen as a family investment, in a daughter’s
future (Bhat & Halli, 1999). Whereas a woman could benefit from the dowry system, to some
extent, women continued to bear the brunt of the cultural or social difficulties associated with its
practice (Banerjee, 2009).
Banerjee (2014) suggested “Dowry death might simply be a result of several factors
including marriage patterns (especially hypergamy) …economic dependency of women and
cultural norms” (pg. 41). Bajracharya, & Amin (2011) would posit that “In particular, the
evaluation of women’s and men’s worth in the marriage market in terms of dowry or bride-price
may have… significant implications for their well-being as adults and for gender equity” (pg. 2
para 1).
Furthermore, dowry hyperinflation was being experienced within India’s marriage market.
Putting the commoners, the vast majority of the populace, the women and the men of modest
means, into a very difficult socio-cultural bind (Bhat & Halli, 1999). Banerjee (2014) noted “the
size of the dowry was designed to maintain or further the societal status of families… which had
…transitioned into a ‘groom price’” (Menski, 1998,)” (pg. 35, para 1).
Subsequently, dowry related violence had been increasing significantly as the practice had
become both more universal and more expensive (Banerjee, 2014). Babu and Babu (2011)
reported that dowry related deaths and dowry-related suicides had risen seventy four and thirty
one percent (from1995 to 2007) (pg. 38). In addition, Banerjee reported a fifty nine percent
increase in overall crimes against women in India from 2001 to 2011 (pg. 34). Gentleman (2013)
noted “An average of one dowry death was reported every 77 minutes according to the National
Crime Record Bureau” (para 5). Furthermore, many cases of dowry violence, and or violence
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against women, remained unreported due to various cultural inhibitions much like within China
and the U.S. (Srinivasan & Lee, 2004), (; Anderson, 2007).
While China, which had been reported as having a preference for male children,
traditionally, was experiencing issues not unlike India. A shortage of marriage age appropriate
women had resulted in significant marriage market inflation, a bride price inflation.
Those who wished to marry, start a family and perpetuate the line as it were, would be
forced to borrow and or pay many years’ worth of earnings in order to secure a bride. These were
the commoners of Chinese society, not the wealthy or newly emerging middle class but the vast
majority of China’s populace. As Zhang ( 2000) reported “Though there was no significant
difference in bride price paid by households of various economic groups… richer households
paid higher bride prices, but… it was not the poorest who paid the lowest” (pg. 63).
Bride price had had an adverse effect on the average Chinese male’s ability to secure a
partner, to afford a bride. Jin, Guo, Liu and Li (2013) added “For the present and in the future,
there are and will be millions of young males who are unable to find brides in China
(Tuljapurkar et al., 1995; Poston and Glover, 2005; Attané, 2006; Li et al., 2006; Jiang et al.
2007)” (pg. 135 para 1).
Partner price in China was significantly less expensive than partner price in India while it
was more expensive than in America, about twice as much on average approximately. America
had the lowest MMGEVR differential of the three sample countries; as a percentage of annual
income while ranking second on the UNGII to China. The U.S. also had a female to male gender
specific socio-expectational flow of goods and or services, just as in India.
Finally, China had the lowest, or the best score on the UNGII and was the only sample
country with a net male to female gender specific socio-expectational flow; an effective partner
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price, or bride price. None the less, the number one cause of injury to a woman in China was
from an intimate partner (XU, Zhu, O’Campo, Koenig, Mock and Campbell, 2005). This was
true of India and America as well.
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The U.S. marriage market values system; the U.S.’ culturally accepted and widely
practiced marriage related norms, courting or dating system, would appear to be a system which
empowered and condemned. And, like China and India, one that would do so based on normative
socially accepted gender specific constructs. In addition, it would appear that this conjugal
patriarchal power system might be capable of extending its influence far beyond the confines of
the conjugal social construct, beyond the confines of the marriage itself.
Coontz (2004) wrote “For all socio economic classes, marriage was the most important
marker of adulthood and respectability” (pg.4 para 9). Further, it was said to be an effective way
of extracting labor from the young, a means of consolidating basic survival activities, economic,
security, and perpetuation. What of marriage in modern times? De Mor & Van Zanden (2009)
expressed that “…a household was a cooperative economic unit aimed at the fulfilment of the
physical and emotional needs of its members, and characterized by certain inequalities” sexual,
generational (pg. 3 para 2).
Marriage as an institution in the west had gone through many changes throughout history.
Everitt (2012) cited the importance of strategic alliances; bonds of family, bonds of trust, as the
foundations for ever larger alliances, and ever larger strategic collectives- economics and
security. Politics would not be far behind, the politics of wealth, nor would religious
consecration of the marriage construct (circa 11th & 12th centuries). Modern traditional JudeoChristian wedding vows were credited to Thomas Cramer circa 1549; “…to have and to hold, for
better, for worse, for richer, for poorer.”.
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The history of marriage in the United States was one of “utilitarian reasoning” as Cott
(2000) put it (pg. 10 para 2). One in which the founding fathers saw Christian consent based
monogamous marriage as a natural extension of this new republican form of governance,
government by choice. Cott (2012) continued that it was “this thinking which propelled the
analogy between the two forms of consensual union into the republican nation’s selfunderstanding and identity” (pg. 10 para 2).
It was true that president Obama had said America was no longer just a Christian nation
(Obama, 2008). However, some 77 percent of Americans in a recent Gallup poll identified
themselves with a Christian religion (Newport, 2012).
Christian based consensual marriage did come to dominate the United States. While many
of the utilitarian aspects of this construct would prove useful to society at large; , more stable
environments for children, effective economic partnering, increased productivity and the like,. It
it had effectively increased the man’s, the husband’s power both in society and in the
relationship. The woman would give up her name, her identity to be called by his name; this was
legally defined as “coverture”, with the wife being called the “feme-covert” (Cott, 2000 pg. 11
para 3). Furthermore, the wife could not own property, conduct legal affairs sign contracts and
the like. The husband did in fact become his wife’s legal and political representative, effectively
“…disenfranchising her” as Cott (2000) put it (pg.12 para 1).
This was reminiscent of the ancient Roman “house-father” who ruled with absolution,
none in the household had any legal rights, not children, not wives, not slaves (as cited in
Westermarck, 1968 pg. 137, para 2).Whereas it would be the man and the woman consenting
ostensibly, it was religion, politics, and society setting the rules for the construction of, or for the
context of the consent- utilitarian, patriarchal (Cott, 2000, ; Westermarck, 1968).
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Marriage was certainly about money, power and survival around the world, and throughout
history and America was no exception (Coontz, 2005). Lamont (2014) noted “…traditional
gender ideologies remain remarkably resilient, as courtship conventions symbolizing men’s
dominant, breadwinning status stubbornly persist (Eaton and Rose 2011)” (2014 pg. 190, para 1).
Further, Christensen (2011) reported on gender perceptions regarding the financial prudence of a
potential partner and noted that 61% percent of men held a positive view of a thrifty blind date,
she was “…smart and sexy”, while 66% of women held a negative view, he was “…a turnoff”,
and an additional 17% of women called the anonymous thrift minded male boring (para 6).
Women had had, historically speaking, a much better chance of marrying up, compared to
men- patriarchy could work to their favor, some of them. Until recently, nowadays more women,
than men, are marrying down (Wang, 2014). The marriage market was fluid. Yet patriarchal
expectations remained none the less. Was there a feedback loop in effect, potentially seeding
more power to the relative local social male construct? Lamont (2014) noted “The majority of
the women expressed a preference for conventional courtship behaviors and expected men to ask
and pay for the first date, confirm the exclusivity of the relationship, and propose marriage” (pg.
197 para. 2).
Was the female consenting, by way of her choosing to participate according to established
local customs, could this be a response, conscious or unconscious, to local relative marriage
equity market range value, or marriage market values systems social expectancies? In being
expected to and or willingly acquiescing to normative coupling observance behavioral patterns
thereby signaling to the male, as well as to society at large; religion, friends, family, mentors, her
own potential willing subservience.
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Lamont (2014) reported “Although women asserted that personal choice governed their
courtship behavior, their efforts to conceal nonconforming behavior indicated that gendered
expectations guided their decision making” (pg.207, para 1). In fact, gender specific traditional
expectations of the American marriage observance were possibly more suitable for use in this
study than the actual specific expenditures incurred and by whom. Was this the origin of the
potential feedback loop?
What if anything could any of this portend? There is the possibility of error or biases
within the data sets. There is also the possibility that any potential preliminary correlation might
prove to be unsubstantiated in the future. None the less, I believe it to mean that perhaps a closer
look at the cause and effect potential of relative local coupling observances, of marriage market
values systems worldwide, including right here in America to be in order.
Further, these results show the potential for this type of an analysis pursuant to addressing
gender inequality issues worldwide. Many obstacles prevent the collection and assessment of
meaningful data pursuant to gender inequality worldwide, as noted by the United Nations. I
believe this type of an assessment may prove the potential for to be beneficial.
The UNWW 2010 report noted “Increasing the capacity to produce reliable and timely…
gender statistics, remains a formidable challenge for many countries” (pg. XII para. 7). The same
concern previous UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan (2005) had expressed five years earlier in
the UNWW 2005 report, “Ten years after the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform
for Action, the lack of reliable national statistics on gender issues persisted in many parts of the
world” (pg. III).
It had become common knowledge that women lagged behind men in nearly every
statistical category everywhere around the world (UNWW, 2014). Women made less money,
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worked longer hours, owned fewer assets and were faced with greater levels of gender specific
violence than men (UNWW 2012).
Although levels and rates of violence against women may have represented considerable
local variability the violence was universal and ongoing. The UNWW (2010) reported “…such
abuse occurs in all countries or areas without exception” (pg. X, para 6). Gender wealth and or
wage inequality was universal and was ongoing as well. Tijdens & and Van Klaveren (2012) in
an ITUC report on gender pay inequality noted “No significant progress has been made in
closing the global gender pay gap for over a decade” (pg. C).
The roots of gender inequality would appear to run deep. How could this be a simple matter
of cultural difference when it was both a worldwide and a universal ongoing phenomenon?
Perhaps it was time to consider looking to root local relative cultural coupling observances’
traditions. , To to marriage market values systems, and the potential role that they may play in
reinforcing widely acknowledged and systemic worldwide gender inequality.
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Appendix B- Data figures China
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Chart 2.1 China bride price data
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Chart 2.3 China MMGEVR data
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Chart 3.1 Engagement ring price data, M/F socio-expectational economic flow (adjusted)
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Chart 3.2 Wedding price data, F/M socio-expectational economic flow (adjusted)
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Chart 3.3 Honeymoon price data, M/F socio-expectational flow (adjusted)
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Chart 3.4 Per capita income U.S. (annual)
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Appendix D- Data figures U.S. continued
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Chart 3.5 MMGEVR data
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Appendix E- comparative data
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UNGII Legend: 0 = gender equality, -00 = male gender inequality, +0 = Female gender inequality
MMGEVS Legend: X x APCI; 0 = gender neutral economic flow, -00 = M > F flow, +0 = F > M flow

